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In this paper we construct a much simplified model of private and public 
social decision-making related to health care and health insurance. The 
model is designed to  clarify the logical relationships among health insur- 
ance plans, life insurance and annuities, consumption, medical care and 
nursing care. The paper characterizes an efficient allocation of health 
care and describes decentralized insurance markets that would sustain an 
efficient allocation. The analysis is similar in spirit to papers by Arrow 
(1976) and Nordquist  and Wu  (1976) presented at an earlier NBER 
conference on health economics. 
Individual Preferences and Plans 
Imagine  an economy  with  a  large  number of  consumers,  all  with 
identical tastes. There are two commodities, bread and medical care. 
Tomorrow each consumer will receive a free medical check-up. There are 
n possible diagnoses, dl, . . . ,  d,.  Suppose that today the individuals’ 
probability distributions over diagnoses are independent and identically 
distributed. Let ni  be the probability that any particular consumer will be 
diagnosed as being in condition i.  We assume a simple medical technol- 
ogy. Regardless of  the diagnosis, there are at most two things that can 
happen. The patient can painlessly be restored to perfect health or he can 
die. Let the conditional probability that someone with diagnosis i who 
receives mi  units of  medical care will survive be Oi  (mi). 
Suppose that the amount of medical care that a person receives can be 
made to depend on the diagnosis of his condition. Suppose further that 
the amount of  bread that he (or his heirs) receive can depend both on his 
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diagnosis at the check-up and on whether he survives after being given 
the chosen medical care. As we shall later see, provision of  these contin- 
gent commodities could be arranged either through a centrally imposed 
national plan or in a decentralized way through health insurance and life 
insurance contracts. Possible medical histories can be denoted 4  and d:, 
where 8  denotes the event that one receives diagnosis  i and proceeds to 
die and df.  denotes the event that one survives after having diagnosis  i.  A 
consumption strategy  is  a  vector  (M,B) where  M = (ml,  . . . ,mn) 
specifies the amount mi of medical care that the consumer will receive if 
his diagnosis is i and where B = (by, . . . ,  b:, b:, . . . ,bA) specifies the 
amounts bq  and bf of  bread that the consumer will consume if  he has 
diagnosis i and dies or lives, respectively. We will sometimes speak of  M 
as the consumer’s “medical strategy” and B  as his “bread-consumption 
strategy.” 
In the model discussed, the probability that the consumer has a particu- 
lar medical history is determined by the medical strategy M. The prob- 
ability of medical history d:  given strategy M will be denoted IT (d: I M). 
In particular, our assumptions imply that 
(1)  IT(df.  IM) = @,(mi) 
(2) 
and 
IT(&IM)  =  IT#  -  ei(mi)). 
The von Neuman-Morgenstern  expected utility of  a consumer with 
medical strategy M  and consumption strategy B  will take the form: 
n 
Recall that we have assumed that medical care does not affect utility 
directly, and that after medical treatment one is either restored to perfect 
health or one is dead. Thus the utility function takes the special form 
(4)  u (d; ,  m,  b2 =  u, (b; ) 
where u1  (b)  can be viewed as the utility of the prospect of surviving and 
consuming b units of bread and uo  (b)  as the utility of the prospect of dying 
and leaving b units of  bread to one’s heirs. From equations (1) -  (4) we 
see that (3) could be written equivalently as: 
n 
i=l  V(M,B)  = 2 ~~~Oi(m~)ul(bf:) 
In most of the remaining discussion we will assume that the functions 
uo(.),  u1  (.) and €),(a)  are nondecreasing and concave. Assuming concav- 
ity of u1  (.) and uo(*)  is equivalent to assuming that the consumer is either 301  Medical Care, Medical Insurance, and Survival Probability 
risk-averse  or risk-neutral with  respect  to bets that leave his survival 
probability unchanged. Concavity of the Bi’s means diminishing marginal 
returns to medical care. 
An Optimal Centrally Imposed Health Plan 
Having examined individual preferences for medical care and bread, 
we now consider the options available to the economy as a whole. We 
begin by considering a hypothetical central authority that seeks to  impose 
a national health care plan. We define an “allocation  of  consumption 
strategies”  to be  a  list,  (M’,B’, . . . ,MK,BK),  of  the  consumption 
strategies, (Mk,Bk),  of each consumer k. Since all consumers have iden- 
tical preferences and the same prospects before their medical check-ups, 
it is of  special interest to consider those allocations that offer all consum- 
ers the same consumption strategy. Such an allocation plan will be called 
a “uniform national plan.” 
Let [M,B]  be a uniform national plan that offers each consumer the 
consumption plan, (M,B).  If  the number of consumers is K,  then the 
total number of persons with diagnosis i will be Kni and total consump- 
tion of  medical care by these persons will be Knimi.’ Therefore average 
per capita consumption of medical care in the economy is certain to be 
if  the national plan is (M,B). 
If  the national  health  plan  is  [M,B],  then  the proportions  of  the 
population  with  medical  histories  di and  4  are  niOi(mi) and 
ai(l  -  €),(mi))  respectively.  Therefore average  per capita bread con- 
sumption in the economy will be 
(7) 
n 
B(M,B)=  c nioi(m,)bf:  + c ai(i  -  e,(mi))bq  “  i=l  i= 1 
The feasibility of a national plan depends on whether the economy can 
supply the total outputs KM and KB. We develop here a very simple 
model of the productive capacity of  the economy which is sufficient to 
illustrate the relevant issues. Suppose that it is technically possible to 
convert one unit of  bread into  units of medical care (regardless of  how 
many units are produced). Suppose also that there is an initial endow- 
ment of  b units of  bread per consumer and that each consumer who 
survives produces h units of  bread (or equivalently $-  units of medical 
care). Consumers who do not survive produce nothing. 
The proportion of the population that survives is determined by M and 
can be written as: 
n 
i= 1  n,(~)=  c niei(mi).  (8) 302  Theodore S. Bergstrom 
Therefore the total output of  the economy measured in terms of  bread 
must be K[b + II, (M) h]  and the constraint on the feasibility  of a national 
plan, (M,B)  is: 
(9)  K[B(M,B)  +pM(M)]  = K[b  + rI,(M)h]. 
Since consumers are assumed to have identical preferences, we don’t 
need a deep welfare economic analysis to arrive at a criterion for an 
optimal national plan. We simply seek a national plan that maximizes  the 
utility of a representative consumer on  the set of feasible plans. We define 
an “optimal uniform national plan” to be a uniform national plan (M,  B) 
that maximizes V(M,B),  as defined in equation (5) subject to the feasi- 
bility constraint expressed in equation (9). Although an optimal uniform 
national plan is, by definition, not dominated by any feasible allocation 
that treats all consumers in exactly the same way, there might conceivably 
be feasible allocations that are Pareto superior to an optimal uniform 
national plan  but treat some consumers differently from others. The 
following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix to this paper 
establishes conditions under which there are no such allocations. 
Proposition 1 
strategies be those such that: 
For an economy, let the set of  feasible allocations of  consumption 
K-  z  [B(Mk,Bk)  +pM(Mk,Bk)] 
k=  1 
K 
k=l 
=Kb+  z  rI,(Mk)h. 
If  uo(-)  and u1  (.) are concave functions, then an optimal uniform national 
plan is Pareto optimal. 
Proposition  1 enables us to restrict  our search for an equalitarian 
Pareto optimal allocation strategy to the set of  uniform national plans. 
Proposition 2 allows us to further limit the domain of  search. 
Proposition 2 
Let V(M,  B) be the expected utility function defined in equation (5). If 
uo(*)  and u1 (.) are concave functions, and if  (M,B)  satisfies the feasibil- 
ity constraint (9), then there exists a consumption plan, (M,B)  such that 
)i(MLB)Z V(M,B),  -  (M,  E)  satisfies the  budget  equation  (24),  and 
B = (b’, . . . ,  b1,6’,  . . . ,  bo)  gives the consumer or his heirs a bread 
consumption that depends only on whether he lives or dies and not on the 
diagnosis he receives. 
Proof: 
If  (M,B)  -  satisfies  - (24),  then  so  does  (M,B)  where  B= 
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where 
Furthermore, since u1  (a)  and uo(.)  are concave functions, it must be that 
It follows that V(M,B)  z-  V(M,B). 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2 enables us to confine our search for an optimal uniform 
national plan to those plans in which consumption strategies, (M,  B), 
have the property that 
We will  frequently  denote such strategks by  (M,  b',  b')  and their 
expected utilities by 
(12) 
The definition (7) of  B  (M,  B)  reduces to 
V(M,b',b')~IIl(M)ul(b')  + (1 -  II1(M))uo(bo). 
(13)  B(M,bO,b')  = [rIl(M)b' + (1 -  rI,(M))bO] 
Thus the constraint in (9) can be written 
(14)  K[rIl(M)b' + (1 -  rI,(M))bO 
+pM(M)]  = K[b  + rI,(M)h]. 
or equivalently: 
(15)  111  (M)  (b' -  h)  + (1 -  II1  (M))bo  +  pM(M)  = b. 304  Theodore S. Bergstrom 
Assuming  that the derivatives,  ub (.) ,  u; (.),  and 8; (.), exist  every- 
where, the first-order necessary conditions for an interior solution to the 
maximization of  (12) subject to (15) can be written: 
and for i= 1,.  . . ,n: 
u1 (b')  -  uo(b") 
+  [b'-h-bO] L  an (M) 
u;  ($1)  (17) 
I3 mi 
ami 
From the definitions of  II,(M)  and M(M),  it follows that (17) is equiva- 
lent to 
Equations (16) and (17) have simple and rather interesting interpreta- 
tions. Equation (16) require that the marginal rate of  substitution be- 
tween bread contingent on being alive and bread in one's estate  should be 
unity. Notice that this is true regardless of the probability distribution of 
medical histories. Typically one would expect the functions u1  (.) and 
uo(-)  to have the property that if  u;(b')  = ub(bo)  then ~l(b')>uo(bO). 
Operationally this means that at an optimal solution, consumers would 
prefer a higher survival probability to a lower one. 
On  the left side of  (17) the rate of change of survival probability due to 
an increment  in  mi is  multiplied  by  an  individual's  marginal  rate of 
substitution between survival probability and bread. This expresses the 
rate at which an individual would be willing to make a small exchange of 
bread for an increase in the amount of medical care he would receive if he 
had  diagnosis  i.  On the right  side of  (17) the term p-is  the direct 
resource  cost  of  increasing  mi  while  the  term  [b' -  h -  bo] 
an'(M)  represents  the  per  capita  effect  on  net  bread  require- 
ments due to the fact that increasing mi also increases the proportion of 
the population that is consuming b'  and producing h units of bread, and 
reduces the proportion of the population whose heirs must be given bo 
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(19)  e;(m;)  = . . . =e,: (m,) 
Thus we  see that  an optimal  health  plan  has  the property  that the 
marginal contribution of medical care to the conditional probability that 
one survives contingent on a diagnosis is equalized for all diagnoses. 
Equation (19) emphasizes a fact that, on reflection, should have been 
obvious from the start. An optimal health plan will exclude some tech- 
nically possible  medical  treatments on the grounds that they are too 
expensive.  Equalizing  0:  across  diagnoses  certainly  need  not  imply 
equalizing Oi  across diagnoses. In fact, in an optimal medical plan there 
may be diagnoses for which only a small amount of medical care is given 
and from which  recovery  is then  unlikely  even though there exists a 
medical cure which, though very expensive, would ensure that persons 
with this diagnosis survive. 
A Decentralized Economy with Actuarially Fair Insurance 
We now consider provision of  medical services and bread by means of 
private markets. We  will show that an optimal national plan could also be 
reached as a competitive equilibrium with appropriate insurance mar- 
kets. Let each consumer own an initial endowment of  b units of bread. If 
and only if he syrvives, he will produce an additional h units of bread. As 
before we assume that one unit of  bread can always be costlessly con- 
verted into one unit of medical care. 
In this paper, a “health insurance plan” is a contract that specifies a 
vector p = (pl,  . . . ,  pn)  where a positive pl is the net amount, measured 
in  units  of  bread, that  the insurance  company  will  pay  a consumer 
enrolled in the plan if  the consumer has diagnosis i.  If  pl is a negative 
number, then the consumer  will pay the insurance company a net amount 
pi  if  the consumer’s diagnosis is i.  The expected value of payments to the 
consumer under health insurance plan p is then  X nipi. 
If transactions costs for the insurance company can be ignored and if 
the number of identical consumers is large enough so that the variance in 
the proportion of  the population  with  a given diagnosis is negligible, 
then, to a close approximation, in competitive equilibrium, insurance 
companies must be willing to offer any actuarially fair health insurance 
plan. Thus an equilibrium health insurance plan must satisfy 
n 
i= 1 
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Here we  will  treat insurance plans  that are commonly called  “life 
insurance” and “annuities” as two different kinds of bets that could be 
made between a consumer and a life insurance company. For us, a life 
insurance-annuity plan is a contract that states payments (measured in 
units of  bread) to be made from the insurance company to the consumer 
(or vice versa) where the direction of net payments depends on whether 
the consumer lives or dies. Any life insurance-annuity plan is described 
by a vector (ao,a’).  If a’ is positive and a’  is negative, the plan is called 
“life insurance”. If the signs are reversed, the plan is called an “annuity”. 
If  (ao,a’)  is life insurance, then the consumer’s estate receives a net 
payment (measured in units of  bread) of  a’ if he dies, while the consumer 
pays the insurance company a1  if he survives. If  (ao,al)  is an annuity, 
then the consumer pays the insurance company a net amount ao  if he dies 
and receives a net amount a’  if  he survives. 
As we did with health insurance, we assume away transactions costs 
and asymmetries of  information, and assume that statistical variation in 
the proportion of  the population  having any particular life history  is 
negligible. Therefore the supply side conditions for competitive equilib- 
rium require that life insurance-annuity plans be actuarially fair. In this 
case, the condition for actuarially fair insurance is a bit more complicated 
than in the case of health insurance. One’s survival probability depends 
on how much medical care he would obtain in the event of  each possible 
diagnosis. Therefore actuarially fair life insurance-annuity plans must in 
general have rates that depend on the amount of  medical care one will 
purchase in each contingency. On the face of it, it would seem unreason- 
ably difficult to enforce a contract, signed between the insurance com- 
pany and the consumer before the physical check-ups are made, requiring 
the consumer to purchase no less or more medical care in the event of 
each contingency than is specified in the life insurance or annuity con- 
tract. 
As  it turns out, a consumer who has chosen an insurance plan that gives 
him the best ex ante prospects possible with an actuarially fair plan will 
not in the event of any realized diagnosis be able to afford a combination 
of bread and medical care that he prefers ex post to that provided by the 
consumption strategy chosen ex ante. This is true even if medical insur- 
ance takes the form of lump sum payments contingent on one’s diagnosis 
and not tied to any particular level of purchases of  medical care. There- 
fore an insurance company can  offer  actuarially  fair  rates simply  by 
setting its rates as a function of  one’s health insurance plan. 
A  “consumer’s  consumption  strategy”  is  a  vector  (M,B) where 
M = (ml,  . . . ,mn)  states the amount, mi,  of medical care that the indi- 
vidual  plans  to  consume  if  he  has  diagnosis  i  and  where 
B = (by, . . . ,b:,b:, . . . ,b,’,) states the amount bp  of  bread  that he 
plans to  consume if he has diagnosis i and dies and the amount b,’, that he 307  Medical Care, Medical Insurance, and Survival Probability 
plans to consume if he has diagnosis i and lives. We call M his medical 
care strategy and B his bread consumption strategy. A consumer’s “insur- 
ance plan” consists of a health insurance plan and a life insurance-annuity 
plan. A “health insurance” plan is a vector p = (pl, . . . ,  pn)  where pi 
represents net payments (possibly negative) measured in units of bread 
from a health insurance company to a consumer in the event that he has 
diagnosis i. A “life insurance-annuity’’ is a vector (ao,al)  where a’ and 
a’ represent net payments  (possibly  negative)  from  a  life  insurance 
company to a consumer respectively if he dies or lives. A health insurance 
plan, p,  is “actuarially fair” if it satisfies equation (20). A life insurance- 
annuity plan is actuarially fair contingent on M if 
(21)  rI1(M)al+(l  -rI,(M))aO=O 
The insurance plan (p,ao,al)  is said to be actuarially fair with respect to 
M if  it is actuarially fair, and (ao,a’)  is actuarially fair with respect to M. 
Suppose a consumer chooses the insurance plan (p,ao,al).  If he then 
has diagnosis i and survives, his net receipts from the insurance com- 
panies will be pi  + a’.  He has an initial allotment of  b units of bread and 
he produces  an  additional  h  units.  Thus he  has  a  total  number  of 
pi  + a’  + b + h units of  bread to be spent on medical care and bread. His 
purchases in this event must therefore satisfy 
(22)  pmi  + b$  = pi + a’  + b + h 
If a consumer has diagnosis i and dies, he and his estate receive pi + a’ 
from the insurance companies. He has an initial endowment of  b and 
produces no additional bread. Therefore his purchases in the event of this 
medical history must satisfy 
(23)  pmi + b? = pi  + ao + b . 
An insurance plan p,  (ao,a’)  is said to “sustain” the consumption plan 
(M,B)  if equations (22) and (23) are satisfied for i = 1, . . . ,n. 
All of  the propositions to be developed here assume implicitly the 
special structure of  our model. However, each of them can be extended in 
a fairly transparent way to much more general models. 
Proposition 3 
If the consumption plan (M,  B)  can be sustained by an insurance plan, 
(p,a0,a’)  that is actuarially fair with respect to M,  then (M,B)  must 
satisfy the following budget constraint: 
n 
C  IT~[~WZ~  + 8i(mi)(bi -  h) 
i= 1  (24) 
+ (1 -  ei(rni))b:]  = 6 308  Theodore S. Bergstrom 
Proof: 
For each i,  multiply both sides of equation (22) by ITiOi(mi)  and both 
sides of equation (23) by ri(l -  ei(mi))  and add the resulting 2n equa- 
tions. This yields: 
2 .ribmi  + Bi(mi)bf.  + (1 -  Oi(m;>)bq] 
i=l  (25) 
= 2 
+ ei(mi)h]  + 6 
+ ei(mi)al  + (1 -  ei(mi)>ao 
i= 1 
Since the insurance plans are assumed to be actuarially fair, equations 
(20) and (21) apply. Using (20) and (21) and slightly rearranging terms 
one obtains (24) from (25). 
Q.E.D. 
From Propositions 2 and 3, we arrive at the following result. 
Proposition 4 
Let (M,  bo,  6')  be a consumption plan that maximizes 
over all (M,  bo,  b'  ) 2  0 such that: 
(27)  M(M)  +rI,(M)(b'-h) +(I  -rI1(M))bo=b. 
Then V(M,  B)  2 V(M',  B' ) if (M',  B' ) can be sustained by an insurance 
plan that is actuarially fair with respect to M'. 
Proposition 5 
If  (M,bo,b')  satisfies equation (27), then there exists an insurance 
plan, (p,ao,al)  that sustains (M,bo,b')  and is actuarially fair with re- 
spect to M. 
Proof: 
Given M  and (bo,bl),  let: 
We prove  Proposition  5 by  exhibiting the claimed  insurance plan. 
n 
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It is easily verified that the insurance plans defined in (28), (29), and 
(30) satisfy equations (20), (22), and (23). Furthermore, if  equation (27) 
is satisfied, it is a matter of  straightforward verification to show that 
equation (21) is satisfied. Therefore (M,B)  is sustained by the insurance 
plan (p,ao,al),  the health insurance plan, p, is actuarially fair, and the 
life insurance-annuity plan, (ao,  a’),  is actuarially fair contingent on M. 
Q.E.D. 
From Propositions 4  and 5 we deduce: 
Proposition 6 
If (M*,  bo*,  b’*  ) solves the constrained maximization problem posed in 
Proposition  5, then  (M*,bo*,b’*)  maximizes  V(M,B)  on the set of 
consumption strategies (M,  B) that can be sustained by an insurance plan 
that is actuarially fair contingent on M. 
Supply considerations require that a competitive equilibrium insurance 
plan be actuarially fair. Demand conditions require that an equilibrium 
insurance plan sustain a consumption strategy that consumers like at least 
as well as any consumption plan sustainable by another insurance plan. 
These considerations, together with Proposition 1, suggest the appro- 
priateness of  the following definitions. 
We define a “competitive consumption strategy” for a consumer to be 
a strategy (M*,  bo*,  bl*)  that solves the constrained maximization prob- 
lem posed in Proposition 4.  A “competitive equilibrium insurance plan” 
is defined to be an insurance plan, (p*,ao*,a’*)  that sustains the com- 
petitive consumption strategy (M*,  B* )  and is actuarially  fair with respect 
to M*. 
Proposition 7 
If  preferences are continuous and if n,  (M) is bounded away from 0 and 
from 1  for all M, then there exists a competitive equilibrium insurance 
plan. 
Proof: 
If  II, (M) is bounded away from 0 and 1, it is easy to see that the set of 
consumption plans (M, bo,  6,) 2  0 satisfying (27) is closed and bounded. 
Continuity of  preferences implies continuity of  the function, V(M,  B). 
Since continuous functions take maxima on compact sets, there exists a 
competitive consumption strategy, (M* ,  B* ). According to Proposition 
5,  there exists an actuarially fair insurance plan, (p*,ao*,a’*)  that sus- 
tains (M*,B*). 
Q.E.D. 
Observe that the constrained  maximization problem  that defines a 
competitive consumption strategy is formally the same as the maximiza- 310  Theodore S. Bergstrom 
tion problem that defines an optimal uniform national plan. As a con- 
sequence of  Proposition 7, we therefore have the following result. 
Proposition 8 
An allocation of  consumption strategies in which each consumer has a 
competitive consumption strategy is Pareto optimal. 
Propositions 7 and 8 show that an allocation of competitive consump- 
tion strategies exists and is Pareto optimal. Proposition 6 gives us reason 
to think that competitive consumption strategies deserve the title “com- 
petitive” since they are, in a sense, the best strategies a consumer can 
accomplish by means of  a competitive insurance plan. 
There remains some room for doubt. Even if an insurance plan leads to 
the best achievable strategy, ex ante, can we be sure that in the event of 
an announced diagnosis, the consumer might not wish to and have the 
ability to purchase a different amount of  medical care than the optimal 
plan specifies? Thus we might wonder whether a consumer who has a 
positive  initial  endowment of  bread  and  who  receives  an additional 
amount of  bread pi after diagnosis i is announced would indeed choose 
the amount of  medical care that was anticipated in the competitive plan. 
If, say, the diagnosis were that he is almost certain to die if  he does not 
buy a very large amount of medical care and if  the competitive plan does 
not provide a very large amount, might he not then try to spend more on 
medical care than the competitive plan provides? (Even if he can not raise 
a large enough amount of bread to pay for a cure, he could possibly bet 
whatever bread he has in a lottery,  such that if he wins the lottery he  could 
afford a cure.) If  this were the case, then in order for a competitive life 
insurance-annuity contract to be workable, not only would it have to 
include a  provision  specifying  the exact  amount of  medical  care the 
consumer is to purchase in the event of each diagnosis, but that contract 
would  sometimes have  to be enforced, after the medical  check-ups, 
against consumers who may be able to and wish to spend more (or less) 
than the contracted amount on medical care. Proposition 9, however, 
establishes that this is not a problem. In fact, from Proposition 9, we see 
that a competitive equilibrium health insurance plan could take the form 
of a lump sum payment (positive or negative) the size of which is contin- 
gent on the diagnosis.  Even if  all of  the consumer’s assets, including 
expected earnings if  he survives and the expected value of his life insur- 
ance or  annuity plans, could be converted freely at market value after the 
diagnosis  to buy  alternative  bundles of  medical  care and  bread, the 
consumer will  be  best  off  holding  to the  competitive  consumption 
strategy that was sustained by the original competitive health insurance 
plan. A formalization of  this result follows. 311  Medical Care, Medical Insurance, and Survival Probability 
Proposition 9 
Let (M*,  bo*,  b'*) be a competitive consumption strategy that is sus- 
tained by the insurance plan, (p*,b*O,b*').  Then for every event i, a 
consumer's ex post utility function: 
(31)  ei(mi)ul(b')  + (1 -  ei(mi))uo(bO) 
is maximized at (m:,  bl*,bO*)  subject to the constraint: 
(32)  ei(mi)(bl  -  h)  + (I -  ei(mi))bo  +pi 
-  -  -=  Fi  + 6 + ei(mi)d  + (1 -  ei(mi))ao. 
Proof: 
A competitive consumption strategy (M*,  B* ) maximizes 
1 
ei(mi)ul(bf)  + (1 -  ei(mi))uo(bp) 
i=l 
>ei(m:)u,(bl*)  + (1 -  ei(m:))uo(bo*)  , 
it must be that 
pmi + ei(mi)(b)  -  h)  + (1 -  ei(mi))bq 
>pmT -  ei(mi)(bl*  -  h) + (1 -  ei(mi))bo*. 
Equations (22) and (23) imply that 
pmT  + ei(mi)(bl*  -  h)  + (1 -  ei(mi))bo* 
= pi  + ei(mi)d*  + (1 -  ei(mi))ao*. 
Substituting from this equation into the last inequality yields the conclu- 
sion of  Proposition 9. 
Q.E.D. 
Expression (31) is the expected utility function for a consumer who 
knows he has diagnosis i.  Equation (32) describes the budget that would 312  Theodore S. Bergstrom 
be available to him if he could make any actuarially fair revision of  his 
bets. One might argue that it is not realistic to suppose all such bets to be 
available to him. But if  this is the case, our interpretation of  the result 
remains intact. If the consumer can not improve on his existing contracts 
when all actuarially fair rearrangements are possible, then certainly he 
can not improve his prospects if only some of them are available. 
Applications of the Analysis 
A  health insurance  plan, as modelled  in  this  paper, consists of  a 
payment between the insurance company and the consumer, the size of 
which depends only on the consumer’s diagnosed condition. In fact, as  we 
showed in  the proof  of  Proposition  5,  if  M* = (ml , . . . ,mz) is  an 
optimal medical care plan, then M* is sustained by an insurance plan in 
which the net payment between the insurance company and the consumer 
in the event of  diagnosis  i is mT  -  %* where %* = C rim; is the ex- 
pected cost of  medical care in an optimal medical strategy. Such a plan 
amounts to having the consumer pay an insurance premium equal to %* 
regardless of  his health state. In return the consumer receives, contingent 
on diagnosis i, the amount rn: which is the full cost of the efficient level of 
medical care for someone with diagnosis i. 
In most existing medical plans the payment to a consumer is made 
contingent, not on the diagnosis of his health, but rather on the amount 
he actually spends on medical care.*  If consumers were to  be reimbursed 
for the entire cost of any level of medical care they chose to purchase, one 
would expect that they would want to purchase more than the amount 
that is efficient. Thus some health insurance plans reimburse essentially 
all medical costs up to a predetermined maximum amount that depends 
on the nature of  the ailment  that is  treated. If  that maximum  were 
approximately equal to the optimal mi* for each diagnosis, then a plan of 
this type would be equivalent to the efficient diagnosis-specific insurance 
we have modelled. Even where an insurance-plan does not specifically 
limit the amount to be spent on particular illnesses, it seems likely that 
restraints are placed on the amount of care by current practice of  physi- 
cians  and  hospitals.  Thus  if  doctors  were  to prescribe  the efficient 
amount, mi*, to patients  with  illness  i and not  offer them any other 
alternatives, then a health insurance plan offering full coverage would be 
efficient. 
Many  existing health care plans  are characterized by  coinsurance, 
where the insurance company pays some fixed fraction of  actual medical 
expenditures. Since the consumer shares in the cost of medical care, he 
has some incentive to economize on its use. On the other hand, if the 
consumer does not have full coverage then he is left to bear some residual 
n 
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risk. Coinsurance is analyzed formally by Arrow (1976), who displays 
necessary conditions for an optimal rate of  coinsurance. 
For a model of the type we have studied, however, an optimal level of 
coinsurance is only second best. In Arrow’s model, payments from the 
insurance company to the consumer are required to depend only on the 
amount of medical care purchased and not on the patient’s diagnosis. The 
second best optimal rate of coinsurance results in too much medical care 
being purchased and too little risk-pooling relative to the optimum for the 
model studied here. To see this we notice that with coinsurance, the 
consumer is able to choose his quantity of medical care while paying less 
than its full marginal cost. Furthermore, because the full cost is not paid, 
his consumption level is not fully insured. 
In the model presented above, health insurance in which payments are 
conditional on diagnoses does better than coinsurance. As we showed, 
not  only  are consumers  left  with  an  incentive  to purchase  efficient 
amounts of medical care, they also are able to achieve full risk-pooling. 
Before we attribute practical significance to this result, it is appropriate 
to ask whether the case is prejudiced by the very special structure of our 
model. Conspicuously missing from this model are costs of  information, 
moral hazard, adverse selection, deception, and fraud. It is reasonable to 
ask whether, in a model with imperfect information, coinsurance offers 
advantages that are not apparent in our special model. In a world where 
information is costly, it might be that medical expenditures are more 
readily observed and measured than diagnoses. Still, before a physician 
decides what medical treatment to perform, he has to make a diagnosis. 
Thus diagnosis+pecific insurance should not require the acquisition of 
knowledge that wasn’t all ready available to the doctor. There also may 
be greater opportunities for fraud in the case of  diagnosis-specific insur- 
ance, although fraudulent reporting of diagnosis would appear to require 
cooperation of the patient and physician. However, particularly if second 
opinions are required, it is not clear that the possibilities for fraudulent 
reporting of  diagnoses are greater than the possibilities for fraudulent 
reporting of expenditures. 
The model we have discussed treats only a single time period. If  we 
were to extend the model to realistically treat the passage of time, the list 
of  possible diagnoses becomes extremely long and complicated, since 
each time path of medical and diagnostic history would have to be treated 
as a distinct event. An insurance plan that determines what happens in 
each case would have to be extremely elaborate. Consumers may find 
decision-making  about  such  complicated  alternatives  too difficult  to 
handle intelligently. Coinsurance presents a very easily stated rule deter- 
mining the payments in each possibility. However, even if  an insurance 
policy that pays different amounts for each possible diagnosis were too 
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imations to such plans that would not be unreasonably difficult to under- 
stand or administer. 
A remaining question is whether diagnostic-specific health insurance is 
better than coinsurance in  a world  where  there is moral hazard  and 
adverse  selection.  This  is  an issue  that deserves much  more careful 
attention than we have time or space to deal with in this paper. 
A separate issue from the question of  coinsurance versus diagnostic- 
specific insurance  is  whether private competitive health  plans would 
perform as well as governmentally imposed plans. If, for example, it is 
thought that private consumers typically do not think intelligently and 
objectively about health-related matters then a case exists for imposed 
solutions. Where there is moral hazard and adverse selection, little is 
known about the existence and welfare economic properties of  competi- 
tive insurance market equilibrium. Thus it might be that in more realistic 
models, the case for private insurance is less good than in the model 
presented above. 
There is a widespread view that existing private medical insurance 
plans, as  well as medicare and medicaid, are deficient in their provision of 
“catastrophic health insurance”. Private insurance plans typically place a 
ceiling on the total amount of payments they will make in a year. Private 
plans, medicare, and medicaid also typically limit the number of days of 
hospitalization for which they will pay. It seems intuitively appealing to 
think that health insurance plans that will not pay for the very expensive 
medical care that would accompany a catastrophic illness are not fulfilling 
the main function of  insurance, namely pooling the risks of big losses for 
risk-avers& consumers. Perhaps the main selling point of  the national 
health insurance bills that have in recent times appeared in Congress, 
such as the Long-Ribicoff bill and the Kennedy-Mills bill, is the fact that 
both provide essentially unlimited coverage in the event of  catastrophic 
illness. 
The model presented here suggests that a case can be made that an 
efficient national health insurance plan should put some limits on the 
amount of  medical care offered, even in the event of  catastrophic illness. 
In fact, it is hard to resist making some  wild guesses about how high such a 
ceiling might be. In particular, imagine an illness that one might get with 
some very small probability,  vi.  Suppose that there are two feasible 
treatments of  this illness. One treatment costs a negligible amount and 
leaves only a small probability that the patient will survive. A second 
treatment costs $c and is sure to cure the patient. How large can c be if the 
optimal medical strategy is to choose the second treatment? The per 
capita cost of providing all consumers with the second treatment rather 
than the first will be approximately $vTTic.  The gain in ex ante survival 
probability to each consumer from using the second plan rather than the 
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added by  choosing  the second  treatment is  just  $ric  + rri = $c. An 
efficient medical strategy would choose the more expensive treatment if 
and only if  c is less than the marginal cost at which survival probability can 
be increased  by  other means,  such as improving the construction  of 
highways, or reducing occupational hazard. These numbers should, in 
turn, be equal to individual willingness to pay  for increased  survival 
probability.  Rosen  and Thaler (1975) have estimated, from the wage 
premiums  paid for occupational risk of  death, a marginal rate of substitu- 
tion between survival probability and wealth that amounted to between 
twenty and forty times the annual wage of  the population studied. Thus 
according to their estimates, someone with an annual income of  $20,000 
should be willing to buy actuarially fair insurance  against a relatively 
unlikely illness that costs $400,000 or  possibly up to $800,000 to cure. The 
benefit ceilings on the existing medical plans that I have heard described 
are much lower than that. Of  course, most medical treatments are not 
nearly  as effective  as the one we  have just  modelled.  Typically  the 
treatment will make only a small change in the conditional probability 
that one survives, and furthermore it may restore one not to full health 
but to some relatively unpleasant form of invalidism. 
One feature of  catastrophic illness that is not well described by the 
analysis so far is the fact that medical care not only takes the form of 
reducing the probability of  death, but may take the form of  easing the 
discomfort of prolonged convalescence or permanent disability. Treat- 
ment in  such cases may be extremely expensive, and the absence of 
treatment may be extremely unpleasant. For illnesses of  this kind, one 
might reasonably wonder whether, say, the feature of the current medi- 
care plan that limits the number of  days of hospitalization that will be paid 
for to 150 days is appropriate. The next section deals with this issue in the 
context of  a more general model which allows other states of  health 
besides “healthy”  and “dead.” 
Invalidism and Nursing Care 
In this section we consider a model with  several different possible 
conditions of  physical well-being. These include various conditions of 
survival with impaired health as well as death and full health. Again, we 
suppose that before medical treatments there are several possible medi- 
cal diagnoses. The probability that someone with a particular diagnosis 
will  reach a given condition of  health depends on how much medical 
treatment he purchases. Formally, we let the possible states of health be 
denoted byj  = 0,1, . . . ,t,  where states 0 and 1  are death and full health 
respectively. We let possible diagnoses be denoted by i = 1, . . . ,n.  The 
probability that someone receives diagnosis i is rri and the conditional 
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care will arrive in health state j is Oj(rni). Therefore if someone adopts a 
medical strategy M = (ml,  . . . ,  m,), the probability that he will arrive in 
health state j is 
M 
rIj(~)-  2  riOf(rni). 
i= 1  (33) 
Suppose that one's utility depends on the state of  his health and the 
amount of  bread that he consumes. Let a bread consumption strategy 
consist of a vector b = (b",  b', . . . ,  b")  specifying the amount bjof bread 
that an individual will consume if he arrives in each health condition j. 
The expected utility of  a consumer with the consumption strategy (M,  6) 
is then: 
e 
V(M,b)= c rIj(M)Uj(!+). 
j=O  (34) 
As in our earlier discussion we can find necessary conditions for an 
optimal uniform national plan. Suppose that there is an initial endow- 
ment of b units of bread per capita and that an individual in health state j 
can produce  h'  units of bread. Then the feasibility constraint for a uniform 
national plan is 
XrI'(M)(bj- h') +p(M(M))  = 6 
I  (35) 
(where M(M)  is defined in  (6).) Maximizing (34) subject to the con- 
straint, (35), yields the following conditions: 
(36) 
and 
u; (6') = u; (b')  for j = 1, . . . ,n 
(37) 
Since the conditional probabilities of the various outcomes must sum to 
one, it follow that: 
d0i  c -=o 
dmi 
j=O 
for each i. 
Therefore (37) can be written equivalently as: 
(39) 
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Where ho is assumed to be zero, it is clear that (39) generalizes (18). 
Equations (36) and (39) can be given reasonable economic interpreta- 
tions without a great deal of difficulty. Furthermore, results analogous to 
those in the previous sections on the sustainability of  an optimum by 
actuarially fair insurance plans can be found. I think, however, that more 
insight  can be gained  by  looking carefully  at a very  special case.  In 
particular, suppose that we let the expected utility representation take 




uo(bo)  =f(po + b'): where po>O. 
ul(bl) =a1  +f(b'):  where al>O 
u2(b2)  = a2  +f(b2  -  p2) if  b2>  p2 and 
u2(b2)  =f(O)  if  b2zp2:  where p2>0 and a2<a1. 
These functional forms were chosen to crudely depict the following 
features of  preferences. The a's represent a pure preference over health 
states, independent of consumption. The presence of the parameter Po  in 
uo(.)  represents the notion that the needs of  one's family for consumption 
goods are reduced if one dies. The particular representation chosen here 
is entirely for analytic convenience. The parameter pz  in u2(.)  represents 
a cost of  nursing care that is not needed by healthy people, but without 
which invalids would be extremely miserable. Once the amount of  nurs- 
ing care, p2,  is provided, the individual enjoys the same marginal (but not 
total) utility schedule for consumption as he would if  he were healthy. 
Assuming th?t f"(6) <  0 for all 6 2  0, the first-order conditions in (36) 
together with the functional specifications in (40)-(42) imply that for the 
optimal consumption plan: 
(43)  bo=b' -Po  and 
(44)  b2 = b'  + p2. 
Then in an optimal plan it follows that 
Thus the optimal plan provides the most consumption goods (including 
nursing care) in the event that the consumer becomes an invalid and the 
least in the event that he dies. 
In the previous  section, we  offered  the suggestion  that it  may  be 
socially efficient to provide no health insurance for people who have 
ailments that are extremely expensive to cure. In such cases an efficient 
plan might allow those who contract such diseases to expire without 
expensive treatment. The critical level of costs in this case is the amount 
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The analysis of  nursing care is rather different in character.  In our 
model, nursing care has no effect on the probability distribution of  health 
states; it simply makes the state of  invalidism less unpleasant. So long as 
an individual can not choose immediate and painless death as an alterna- 
tive to invalidism, the amount, P2, which is efficient for him to spend on 
nursing care could quite possibly exceed the maximum amount that an 
efficient plan would spend on curing an illness. Thus the size of  efficient 
“catastrophe insurance” benefits for nursing care might possibly be larger 
than is appropriate for medical care devoted to “curing”. 
Returning to our formal analysis, we find another, perhaps surprising, 
effect. Let us also suppose that the individual will have earnings, h,  if he is 
healthy and zero otherwise. Let there be only one diagnosis and let Oi(rn) 
be the probability that one reaches health state i if  he spends m  on 
medical treatment. The condition in (39) then reduces to 
The left side of  (46) is the marginal contribution of  a unit of  medical 
treatment to  utility. This contribution comes in part from its effect on the 
probability of being healthy and in part from its effect on the probability 
of  being an invalid. Each of these effects in turn consists of  two compo- 
nents, a direct effect on utility and a “budget effect”. The budget effects 
register the influence of  a change in the probability distribution of health 
state on the expected value of consumption net of earnings. Typically one 
would expect the sign of  the first term in brackets to be positive, indicat- 
ing that when both direct and budget effects are accounted for one would 
prefer to  have a higher probability of being healthy and a lower probabil- 
ity of being dead. The  sign of the second bracketed term could reasonably 
be either positive or negative, depending on how unpleasant and how 
costly it is to be an invalid. It is interesting to notice that even where a2  >  0 
so that one  prefers the prospect of being an invalid (with the consumption 
assigned by an optimal plan) to the prospect of  being dead, the second 
bracketed term in (46) could be negative. If this were the case, a medical 
treatment that increased the probability of  being an invalid and lowered 
the probability  of  dying,  without  changing  the probability  of  being 
healthy, would be socially undesirable even if it were free. The reason, of 
course, is that in this model being an invalid and being cared for at the 
efficient level is much more expensive than being dead. Thus if  the extra 
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being dead is not large, an investment in achieving this status  may not be 
worthwhile. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
We will prove Proposition 1 with the aid of two lemmas which are in 
themselves of  some general interest. We will need just a bit of additional 
definitional  structure. A  “convex  symmetric economy”  is  defined  as 
follows. Let there be m consumers and a set F of  feasible allocations. 
Where (xl,  . . . ,x,)EF  is an allocation, xi  is the consumption bundle 
consumed by consumer i. All consumers, i, have identical concave utility 
functions u (xi). The set F is convex and symmetric, where by symmetric 
we mean that if  (xl,  . . . ,x”) E F,  then (xi, . . . ,xA) E F if  (xi, . . . ,xA) 
can be obtained from (xl,  . . . ,xn) by reassigning the same commodity 
bundles to different individuals. (More formally, if  (xl,  . . . ,xn)  E F and 
xl= x,,(;)  for all i where n(*)  is a permutation on the set of  consumers, 
then (xi, . . . ,xA)EF.) 
An “optimal uniform allocation” is an allocation (f,R, . . . ,R) E F that 
maximizes u(x) subject to the constraint (x,x, . . . ,X)EF.  A  “Pareto 
optimal allocation” is an allocation (xl, . . . ,x,)  such that there exists no 





Let (a, . . . ,R) be an optimal uniform allocation and suppose that for 
(x; ,  . . . ,x;)  E F, u(xT)  2  u (xi) for all i with strict inequality for some i. 
Define R* =-  C x:.  Since F is symmetric and convex, it follows that 
(R*,  . . . ,~*)EF.  But  since  u(.)  is  a  concave  function,  u(R*)2 
1“ 
-  C u(x:)>u(X).  But this contradicts the hypothesis that (2, . . . ,f)  n ;=I 
is an optimal uniform allocation.  It follows that (a, . . . ,R) is Pareto 
optimal. 
Q.E.D. 
If the utility function V(M,  B)  in the text of our paper were concave 
and the set of  feasible  allocations were  symmetric and convex, then 
Proposition 1  would be immediate from Lemma 1. Fortunately (for those 
In a convex, symmetric economy, an optimal uniform  allocation  is 
1” 
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who like tricky proofs) matters are not quite this simple. The function 
V(M,  B) is generally not concave under reasonable assumptions, nor is 
the set of feasible allocations as described in Proposition 1  a convex set. 
However, by a judicious transformation of variables one can demonstrate 
the equivalence of the economy of Proposition 1  to a convex, symmetric 
economy. Using this equivalence, we show that Proposition 1 follows 
from Lemma 1. In order to accomplish this program we will also need the 
following result. 
Lemma 2 
Let u  (x)  be a concave function with domain the nonnegative orthant in 
Euclidean n space. For any positive scalar y  and any vector x  in the 
domainof u(.),define V(y,x)=yu($). Then V(y,x)isaconcavefunction 
on its domain. 
Proof: 
For A between zero and one, 
V(Ay  + (1 -  A)Y’,AX + (1 -  A)x’) 
I 
AX + (1 -  A)x’ 
AY  + (1 -  h)Y’) 
= (Ay  + (1 -  A)Y‘)u 
= (Ay + (1 -  A)~‘)u  + (1 -  A) y’  (G) 
2  (Ay + (1 -  A)y‘)  AY  X 
Ay + (1 -  A)y’ 
[  [ Ay+ (1 -A)y’  ) “(7) 
Ay + (1 -  A)y‘  y‘ 
=  Ayu (x)  +(1-A)y’u  (K) 
Y  Y‘ 
= AV(y,x) + (1 -  A) V(y’,x’). 
The resulting inequality proves the lemma. 
Q.E.D. 321  Medical Care, Medical Insurance, and Survival Probability 
Proof of  Proposition 1 
We make a change of variables by defining a one-to-one transforma- 
tion  T that maps the set  of  feasible  consumption strategies for each 
individual into its image as follows: 
and 
(‘4.3)  zf:=niOi(mi)(bf  -  h). 
To  see  that  T  is  one-to-one  we  notice  that  (for  predetermined 
(r1,  . . . ,nn)  and h)  the equations A.l-A.3 can be inverted to solve 
uniquely for the m’s and b’s in terms of the y’s and 2’s. In particular, we 
have: 
Our objective is now to show that where we describe the economy 
constructed in the text of the paper in terms of the transformed variables, 
we have a convex, symmetric economy. Using equations (5)  of  the text 
and A.4, AS  and A.6, we can write: 
(‘4.7)  V*(Y,Z)=V(T-’(Y,Z))  = 
n 
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From the assumption that u1 and uo are concave functions, from Lemma 
2, and from the fact that the sum of  concave functions is concave, it 
follows that V*  (Y,  Z)  is a concave function. 
We next rewrite the feasibility constraint of Proposition 1 in terms of 
the variables (Y,  Z).  Using (A.4)-(A.6) and slightly rearranging terms we 
can describe the feasible set as follows. A typical allocation is denoted 
(Y’,Z’,  . . .  Y“‘,Zm)  whereconsumerk’sutilityisV*(Yk,Zk).  Thesetof 
feasible allocations is: 
Clearly F* is a symmetric set. Since ei(.)  is assumed a concave function 
for each i, 8; ’  (a)  must be a convex function. It is then easy to show that 
F* is a convex set. 
The economy in which consumers have utility functions V*  (Y,  2)  and 
in which the set of feasible allocations is described by A.8  must therefore 
be  a  convex,  symmetric  economy  which  we  will  call  the  “derived 
economy.”  --  If  (M,B)  is  an  optimal  uniform  national  plan,  then 
V(M,B)  2  V(M’, B’)  if the allocation in which all consumers have M’,  B’ 
is feasible. Where (r,  2)  = T(M,  B)  it follows from our definitions that  (r,  2)  is an optimal uniform allocation in the derived economy. From 
Lemma 1 it follows that (Y,z)  is also Pareto optimal for the derived 
economy. But it is then easy to show that (M,  B)  = T- ’  (Y,  2)  must be 
Pareto optimal for the original economy. 
Q.E.D. 
Notes 
1. Here and subsequently we proceed as if  the proportion of  the population having each 
diagnosis takes on exactly its expected value. Of course the “law of  large numbers” tells us 
only that this proportion comes arbitrarily close to its expected value with arbitrarily high 
probability for a large enough population. If  we were to pursue this more accurate repre- 
sentation carefully, we would find that for large populations, the residual social risk can be 
shared, so as to have  negligible effects on individual utilities.  Thus our shortcut has a 
negligible effect on the results, but much eases exposition. 
2. Useful discussions of a variety of existing and proposed private and public health plans 
can be found in  Davis (1975) and Reed and Cass (1970). 323  Medical Care, Medical Insurance, and Survival Probability 
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